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Abstract
In the context of globalisation and privatisation, an emerging body of literature has applied the concept of an ‘assem-
blage’ to international relations and security studies. This article will argue that an assemblage framework provides the
best means for understanding the complex configuration of cyber security actors, given that contemporary cyber security
practices do not conform to the traditional public-private and global-local distinctions used in security studies and Interna-
tional Relations literature. With the configuration of cyber security actors, and the relationships between them in constant
flux, an assemblage framework provides a means for understanding the contested, dynamic and diachronic nature of con-
temporary cyber security provision. While the concept of security assemblages is favoured in this article, the process and
context in which the term has traditionally been used cannot be blindly imposed on the issue of cyber security. This article
will therefore propose a different model of how cyber security assemblages have developed and explain the implications
this has on contemporary security dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Cyber security is provided by a complex configuration
of actors and institutions (Choucri, 2012). Non-state and
non-traditional actors sit at the forefront of contem-
porary cyber security challenges: multinational corpo-
rations, hacktivist groups, intergovernmental organisa-
tions, and volunteer networks all provide (or threaten)
security in some important way. Whether it be the his-
torically prominent role of private actors in the develop-
ment and growth of cyber-related industries, or the low
barriers to entry, non-traditional actors have developed
meaningful capabilities (Nye, 2011, pp. 113–151). As this
phenomenon has emerged, the traditional distinctions
used to capture international politics are becoming hazy:
the lines between what is public and private, between
what is global and local, are waning. If the Weberian no-
tion of the state, whereby states possess a monopoly on
the legitimate use of force and defence, has ever existed,
its application to cyber security is increasingly limited. Cy-
ber security, therefore, requires refreshed thinking.
The proliferation of security actors leads to impor-
tant questions for international politics. The fragmenta-
tion of security provision has meant that states cannot
take their traditional standing as the primary security
provider in the international system for granted. Gov-
ernment actors may find not only their capabilities, but
also their legitimacy as a security actor fundamentally
questioned. The flight of power away from state struc-
tures has produced what Lucas Kello calls a ‘sovereignty
gap’ where private sector firms and individuals can no
longer take their government’s ability to protect them
for granted as they might have done in the face of other
threats (Kello, 2017, pp. 160–162). Cyber security is of-
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ten provided by a network of actors. Here, existing Inter-
national Relations (IR) theories, concepts and paradigms
provide useful tools in understanding the emerging mod-
els of security provision and their implications for in-
ternational politics. Current academic literature has al-
ready addressed many of the relationships between ac-
tors that are central to cyber security provision, including
public-private partnerships, (Carr, 2016; Dunn Cavelty,
2015; Dunn Cavelty & Suter, 2009) the role of civilian-led
groups (Ottis, 2012; Sheldon &McReynolds, 2015; Suciu,
2015; Toomesaar & Ottis, 2010) and states’ use of prox-
ies (Collier, 2017; Maurer, 2015, 2018; Rattray & Healey,
2011; Schmitt & Vihul, 2014).
The diffuse model of security provision observed in
many cyber security contexts lends itself naturally to
theories and concepts that accommodate actors other
than the state. This is not particularly novel or controver-
sial within IR literature. Concepts such as actor-network
theory and the military-industrial complex have helped
to articulate such a world view where state institutions
work alongside other actors (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty,
2016). These concepts would therefore represent a nat-
ural home of sorts within the IR tradition for understand-
ing contemporary cyber security provision.
Yet, the challenges associated with interpreting and
understanding cyber security provision go beyond just
the proliferation of security actors. The emergence of
various cyber security actors has led to significant disrup-
tion that requires further consideration. Various actors
compete for power and ownership of cyber security is-
sues. First-order questions of what aspects of cyber secu-
rity are ‘public’ or ‘private’ are still being contested and
defined (Egloff, 2017). The incentive structures of differ-
ent security actors often clash rather than converge (Carr,
2016). As state actors further develop, processes of se-
curitisation often follow (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009).
As defence institutions become increasingly interested
in cyber security, the issue becomes further militarised,
creating an atmosphere of insecurity and tension in the
international system (Dunn Cavelty, 2012).
Further, the implications of such a proliferation of
security actors cannot necessarily be captured with uni-
form theories and trends. In truth, various simultane-
ous and yet seemingly contradictory trends coexist, of-
ten unhappily. States are simultaneously undermining
and being undermined by private actors. Private actors
may compete against states while working directly with
them in separate contexts. For example, whilst Apple
has publicly challenged the UK governments stance on
encryption and privacy (Hern, 2015), the US technology
firm also works alongside the UK intelligence commu-
nity with the UK signals intelligence agency, Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), providing Apple
with information about vulnerabilities in their products
(Cox, 2016).
Given the above, simply acknowledging the prolifera-
tion of security actors is not enough. Studying its implica-
tions, however, represents the altogether more interest-
ing question. An emerging body of literature that applies
the concept of an ‘assemblage’ to IR and security studies
provides a useful first step. The security assemblage con-
cept is one able to articulate the empirical realities and
ongoing challenges of contemporary cyber security chal-
lenges. Section two proceeds to define the term and dis-
cuss how it relates to cyber security. Section three then
develops this concept further by suggesting how the for-
mation of cyber security actors and structures is differ-
ent to the contexts in which the concept of a security as-
semblage has typically been deployed. Section four then
presents concluding arguments and considers the practi-
cal applications of the assemblage term.
2. Cyber Security Assemblages
Refreshed thinking is required to better understand the
provision of cyber security and the configuration of cyber
security actors. Here, the term cyber security is defined
as the security of the environment formed by physical
and non-physical components and characterised by the
use of computers and other networked devices. Cyber
security actors, by definition, provide security in some
capacity. Yet this does not mean that all actors strive to
achieve a single, unitary concept of security. The preva-
lence of private actors means that cyber security is often
provided by actors who prioritise other commercial ob-
jectives over security. Encryption disputes between the
US government and technology firms show that different
actors have altogether different motivations.
This makes the study of the different cyber security
providers, and how they interact with one another es-
sential. The concept of global cyber security assemblages
provides a conceptual anchor that provides a means for
further understanding these issues. The term provides
a more appropriate concept for understanding contem-
porary cyber security contexts when compared to more
traditional frameworks. The security assemblage term
refers to new hybrid structures that are often simultane-
ously public and private, global and local. The use of the
term is part of an emerging body of scholarship within IR
literature that seeks to empirically assess complex struc-
tures where a range of different global and local, public
and private security agents, interact, cooperate and com-
pete to produce new institutions, practices and forms
of security governance that cannot be captured neatly
though the boundaries of nation states (Abrahamsen &
Williams, 2011; Williams, 2016).
The assemblage concept therefore moves away
from the traditional centre of the nation-state to
multi-layered, networked configurations that are able
to accommodate a range of entities including (in-
ter)governmental, para-governmental, nongovernmen-
tal, and private organisations (Voelkner, 2013). The
boundaries of an assemblage can be drawn in alternative
ways to the traditional contours of national borders. They
can be drawn to examine the provision of security within
a territory but can also be used to examine security or
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governance contexts that are inherently international.
The issue of internet governance, for example, comprises
a global assemblage of actors, albeit one dominated by
US actors (Carr, 2014). Perhaps the most defining char-
acteristic of the assemblage concept is therefore an ac-
commodation of the forces of globalisation and a scep-
ticism of rigid borders and distinctions. Of course, much
of the above relates closely to other terms including ac-
tor network theory; indeed, the difference between the
terms is one of emphasis, rather than kind (Acuto & Cur-
tis, 2014) with the similarities and differences between
the two concepts discussed in greater detail elsewhere
(Acuto & Curtis, 2014; Müller & Schurr, 2016).
For the purposes of understanding cyber security pro-
vision, it is the notion of assembly and disassembly—
where actors relinquish, transfer and develop capacities
and functions—that is central to the added value of the
assemblage concept. As security functions emerge and
are captured by either public or private actors, actors as-
semble greater capabilities and responsibilities. As pri-
vate actors increasingly take on strategic, ethical, and
foreign-policy alignment issues that were previously out-
side their purview, they are assembling into more polit-
ical actors. Conversely, as aspects of cyber security are
increasingly regulated and managed by states, other as-
pects of private actors’ capabilities and responsibilities
are disassembling. Contemporary cyber security prac-
tices are replete with these instances of assembly and
disassembly. Assemblage thinking therefore pays atten-
tion to the instability of security networks. While cyber
security is provided by a vast array of actors, assemblage
thinking also highlights the contestation related to the
roles and responsibilities of security actors. In light of
emerging and shifting actors, the point is not to demon-
strate that states are stronger or weaker. Rather, the in-
tention is to examine the complex configuration of actors
that maintain contingent and multifaceted relationships
with each other (relationships that cannot be captured
by static and often state-centric theories). Cyber security
is replete with global and local, public and private agents
whose relationships are deeply competitive as well as co-
operative, conflictual, and at times coordinated. While
the concept of a security assemblage has been applied
to cyber security in previous literature (Stevens, 2012,
2016, pp. 181–186), the argument for why and how the
concept should be used and applied to cyber security re-
mains underdeveloped—an imbalance this article hopes
to correct.
These hybrid structures are clearly observed through
contemporary examples with the cyber security of crit-
ical national infrastructure (CNI) in the UK a case in
point. The vast majority of CNI is owned and managed
by corporations—itself a broad church that includes a
variety of actor types including not-for-profit commu-
nity owned private limited firms, regional and UK-based
firms, multinational firms (National Grid operates in
both the US and UK for example, probing traditional
global-local distinctions) and state-owned or quasi-state
owned firms (the now approved Hinkley Point nuclear
plant will be owned and managed by a combination of
French-state majority owned EDF energy and Chinese
state-owned China General Nuclear Power Corporation)
(Ward, Pickard, & Stothard, 2016). As a collective, these
corporations cannot neatly be categorised as ‘private’
given the variety of entities including the presence of
both partially and fully state-owned entities. Corpora-
tions provide cyber security alongside a range of govern-
ment departments, including GCHQ and its subsidiary,
the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC); the Cabinet
Office, the various government departments that are
largely responsible for infrastructure related to their de-
partment and related institutions such as the Centre for
the Protection of National Infrastructure (Collier, 2016).
All of these government entities have their own identi-
ties, agendas andmotivations—a reality that means that
‘the government’ is not necessarily a coherent entity at
all. Adding to the plethora of actors are various interna-
tional organisations and multilateral bodies. Various ac-
tors work together within this cyber security assemblage,
often in unusual ways. With Chinese-based firm Huawei
providing communication equipment for CNI organisa-
tions, GCHQ employeeswill routinelymonitor, take apart
and inspect the equipment supplied (due to security con-
cerns) at a centre that is itself funded by Huawei (Rifkind,
2013; Rosenzweig, 2013).
An assemblage approach also considers the norma-
tive agendas behind the traditional categories and dis-
tinctions used in IR literature. Pursuing assemblage think-
ing means paying attention to the relationships between
a variety of actors and the forces that impel them to
act in the way they do (Lisle, 2013). The process of as-
semblage formation is not neutral but deeply political.
Different actors have clashing views on what aspects of
cyber security should be ‘public’ or ‘private’ as well as
where the boundaries of these distinctions lie. Return-
ing to the UK example, the UK 2016 Cyber Security Strat-
egy declared that market based solutions to cyber se-
curity have ‘not produced the required pace and scale
of change’, meaning that ‘Government has to lead the
way and intervenemore directly by bringing its influence
and resources to bear’ in a move that overtly seeks to
increase the government’s cyber security purview (HM
Government, 2016). On the other hand, governments
have also sought to relinquish both their authority and re-
sponsibility of cyber security issueswithin other contexts
in order to avoid the backlash of security failings (Carr,
2016). This is also observed in recent US encryption dis-
putes that reflect broader political disagreements about
the agency afforded to different actors. Lawenforcement
organisations’ interests in accessing intelligence on de-
vices clash with technology firms who instead seek to
protect their customers’ data from government access,
(albeit while simultaneously selling user data to other
businesses and using it themselves for the purposes of
targeted advertisements). Various government entities
compete with each other for ownership of cyber secu-
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 13–21 15
rity and the tax revenue that accompanies the issue. Al-
ternative visions of cyber security are proposed within
such intra-governmental competition—the issue may be
framed through a military, business or criminal prism
depending on the government entity that seeks to cap-
ture the issue. These tensions are mirrored at the inter-
national level where various multilateral organisations
compete for relevance on the issue including the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the United Nations
(UN) through the Group of Governmental Experts on In-
formation Security; The European Union Agency for Net-
work and Information Security (ENISA); the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU); etc. It is this notion of
contestation that further distinguishes an assemblage
approach from other theoretical lenses that merely ac-
knowledge the importance of units other than states or
the increasingly blurry lines that exist between different
types of actors.
3. The Cyber Security Assemblage Process
The arguments and theoretical developments of previ-
ous assemblage literature provides a rich intellectual
backdrop in which the concept of a global cyber secu-
rity assemblage can be developed. Assemblage thinking
owes its intellectual roots to Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari’s book that developed an ontology that includes
assemblages as a core entity in light of the development
of a number of concepts, including ‘open systems, com-
plexity, emerging and non-linear dynamics’ in the global
system (Deleuze&Guattari, 1987). For Deleuze andGuat-
tari, an assemblage is a number of disparate and het-
erogeneous elements convoked together into a single
discernible formation that displays some form of consis-
tency and regularity while remaining open to transforma-
tive change, either through the addition or subtraction of
elements, or the reorganisation of the relations between
elements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Manuel DeLanda
subsequently developed the concept to develop a com-
prehensive theory of assemblages that challenges exist-
ing social analyses—often focused at either the individ-
ual or societal level (DeLanda, 2002, 2006, 2010).
Assemblages were subsequently considered in an IR
and security studies context. Saskia Sassen has pushed
back against the focus of globalisation literature on the
withdrawal from the state in areas such as the economy
as it often ignores the way states actively participate
in setting up new structures. In short, globalisation is
not a matter of outside private forcers eroding state
power and sovereignty; instead, it is a process entwined
with a restructuring of institutions and power relations
through practices such as privatisation and regulation.
Sassen used the assemblage term to articulate how glob-
alisation has led to a new world order that challenges
state-centric ontologies. The assemblage process de-
scribed by Sassen involves three steps. First, a process
of state disassembly occurs with traditional state func-
tions taken up by private actors. This first shift therefore
involves the transformation of the national state through
the denationalisation or privatisation of national author-
ities and policy agendas (Sassen, 2008). Second, private
actors develop new capacities that allow them to act at
a global level. For Sassen, this primarily came through a
new normative capacity, where private power is increas-
ingly recognised as legitimate and accepted in the inter-
national system (Sassen, 2008). Third, a process of re-
assembly occurs where new actors and capabilities be-
come part of global assemblages that are embedded in
national settings but operate at a global scale (Sassen,
2008; Williams, 2016).
Although state-centric ontologies may no longer be
coherent for Sassen in the context of globalisation and
privatisation, they do at least represent an appropriate
starting point in her analysis. States certainly played a
decisive role in the formation of cyberspace. Yet, it is
not the case that a process of state disassembly has oc-
curred, where many cyber security functions that were
once the purview of states have now been taken up by
private actors. Instead, many cyber security functions
have emerged over time as the internet and networked
technologies have become increasingly integral to so-
ciety. From a theoretical perspective, this means that
while security assemblages provide an ideal lens for ex-
amining cyber security issues, Sassen’s three-part assem-
blage process does not represent an accurate represen-
tation of the development of cyber security actors. Cyber
security provision represents a curious counter-example
to the ongoing trend of states outsourcing security and
military functions to the private sector. In these other
areas of security, traditional state functions are increas-
ingly outsourced to contractors (McFate, 2014; Mum-
ford, 2013; Singer, 2008). In a cyber security context, by
contrast, states have, if anything, expanded their security
role and acquired new functions—often challenging pri-
vate sector governance in the process. It must therefore
be acknowledged that the formation of cyber security as-
semblages contain their own idiosyncrasies.
Rather than Sassen’s three-shift account, a five-shift
process of assemblage formation is a more appropriate
representation of the formation of assemblages in a cy-
ber security context and is outlined below. Note, rather
than to provide a comprehensive history of events, the
objective here is to explain how various actors have de-
veloped and come together in the context of cyber secu-
rity. The five shifts outlined below are therefore overlap-
ping and not necessarily perfectly linear. Moreover, with
‘cyber’ such a broad catch-all term that in fact comprises
a number of separate processes (including encryption
disputes, disinformation campaigns, and internet gover-
nance), clearly not all issues that sit within the concept
have developed in the sameway (Shires & Smeets, 2017).
The following five shifts therefore represent a broad gen-
eralisation, rather than a precise account of specific cy-
ber security issues.
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3.1. One: Development of Underpinning Technologies
The starting point for contemporary cyber security chal-
lenges does not begin with a coherent Weberian state
model. To understand the starting point of contemporary
cyber security challenges, it is necessary to understand
the development of the two key technologies that under-
pin it: computers and computer networks.
It is difficult to confidently declare when the first com-
puter was built, given the range of classifications. The re-
ality is that a gradual process of incremental technologi-
cal developments eventually led to the computers used
today. For example, the first programmable computer
was created by German Konrad Zuse in his parents’ living
roombetween1936 and1938; the TuringMachine,which
became the foundation for theories about computing and
computers, was first proposed by Alan Turing in 1936;
and the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator,
which was the first electronic computer used for general
purposes, was invented by John Presper Eckert and John
Mauchly at the University of Pennsylvania in 1946.
The emergence of computer networks has amore co-
herent history. The first paper on switching theory was
published in 1961 and by the late 1960s, plans of the
ARPANET were being developed. By 1969, a Network
Measurement Center at UCLAwas selected to be the first
node on the ARPANET and the first host computer was
connected. Further design choices that have shaped the
internet in its current form continued to be made into
the 1970s.
For both the creation of computers and the internet,
a number of actors were integral. Indeed, the starting
point of computers and computer networks was an as-
semblage of different actors in its own right: academia
was at the forefront in many of the decisive develop-
ments, yet both states and private sector firms also
played vital roles.
3.2. Two: Development of the Private Sector
While initially an academic and military pursuit, com-
mercial incentives drove the subsequent development
of computers and computer networks. As APRANET was
decommissioned in 1990, the obvious market opportu-
nities of the technology led to an influx of private sec-
tor firms who were willing to invest significantly in re-
search and development. This was seen most clearly in
the US, where several US computer manufacturers, soft-
ware vendors and internet service providers began to de-
velop capabilities at a global level. Firms such as IBM,Mi-
crosoft and Apple grew rapidly during this shift.
These private developments have grown cyberspace
exponentially, making it an integral part of society. With
this growth, cyber security has become an increasingly
important issue.Withmany of today’s cyber security con-
cerns emerging as a result of the private sector driven
growth of networks, it is private actors, who have often
been at the forefront of cyber security challenges.
Through their growth, private actors have also taken
on a greater political role. Microsoft, for example, has
created an international diplomacy team that partici-
pates actively in international fora in order to lobby
the technology firm’s perspective to policymakers from
around the world. Google has likewise become involved
in various political issues, ranging from protecting the
identities of protestors (Halliday, 2012), to developing so-
phisticatedmeasures to steer potential ISIS recruits away
from the terrorist cell (Greenberg, 2016). Yet, whilst po-
litical, ethical and security challenges are thrust upon
private actors, this does not mean they are always em-
braced or anticipated. Social media platforms, for exam-
ple, have come under increasing criticism for failing to
deal with disinformation campaigns. While many private
actors are undoubtedly now political actors in a cyber se-
curity context, this does not, however, mean that they
are necessarily competent in such a capacity.
3.3. Three: State Realisation
Although states played an integral role in the formation
of the internet and the development of networks, gov-
ernments on the whole have responded slowly to the cy-
ber security challenges that have emerged as the private
sector-led growth of cyberspace has developed since the
1990s (with certain military and intelligence agencies an
exception). As computers and networks have become in-
creasingly integral to modern life, states have gradually
woken up to the importance of developing their own
cyber security capabilities and are starting to invest sig-
nificantly in the issue. The variety of government ob-
jectives has naturally led to divergence in the sort of
developments that states have invested in. Authoritar-
ian regimes have developed technology and infrastruc-
ture that prevents dissent and political protest (Deibert,
2013). Conversely, Western democracies have invested
heavily in cyber security programs: the UK Government
has significantly increased its cyber security spending to
£1.9 billion in the period 2016–2021 (HM Government,
2016) while The Pentagon has requested $34.7 billion in
cyber security funding between 2017 and 2021 (Capac-
cio, 2016).
3.4. Four: Emerging Hybridity and Contestation
Computers and computer networks, have always com-
prised an assemblage of actors that includes academia,
governments, private sector firms and advocacy groups.
These assemblages have become increasingly complex
over time with a marked increase in the number of ac-
tors involved. The result is the emergence of increasingly
hybrid structures—assemblages that embed a range of
actors and transcend traditional global-local and public-
private distinctions. For example, information sharing
partnerships also exist with active participation from
both corporations and government entities (NCSC, 2016).
Such security arrangements are neither clearly public
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or private security but instead an amalgamation of the
two—one captured more coherently through an assem-
blage lens. The network of computer emergency re-
sponse teams (CERT) also collaborate through the Fo-
rumof Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) net-
work that combines national and international as well as
public and private CERTS. At a more active level, hacker
groups will assist and work with government actors in
conducting offensive activities. Although these activi-
ties are often state-directed, hacker groups also operate
independently—often representing a government’s in-
terests without explicit instruction or direction from gov-
ernment actors (Suciu, 2015). Such relationships have
been presented as state-proxy relationships (Maurer,
2018) that, by definition, imply a certain binary rela-
tionship between two actors. However, an assemblage
framework that accommodates what are often looser hy-
brid structures and naturally affords a greater agency to
non-state actors provides a more coherent concept for
capturing this empirical reality.
As these cyber security assemblages have grown and
become more complex, they have also represented an
increasing source of tension. Security assemblages are
not necessarily harmonious or stable structures. Assem-
blages are often marked by competition and struggles
for power and influence with different actors appealing
to conflicting visions of what should be ‘public’ and ‘pri-
vate’. The history of cyber security related issues is re-
plete with examples of these tensions. The state is a key
protagonist in the vastmajority of these disputes, becom-
ing increasingly assertive and willing to challenge estab-
lished private sector norms. The growth in their capabil-
ities has therefore proved a notable source of tension
and instability.
3.5. Five: Generativity
If the previous shift described the further development
and growth of hybrid structures, comprised of a range
of pre-existing actors, then the process of generativ-
ity points to the emergence of altogether new actors
and processes.
Generativity, first espoused by Jonathan Zittrain,
refers to the way in which the malleable nature of dig-
ital technologies (such as the internet) allows them to
serve a variety of purposes, potentially providing a plat-
form for innovation that may not have even been fore-
seen by their creators (Zittrain, 2006). Most computers
are designed to be able to run software that is not writ-
ten by the computer manufacturer or operating system
publisher, thereby enabling a computer to be used for a
range of processes that it was not initially designed for.
For example, while Twitter was launched in 2006, com-
puters built before this time would nevertheless be able
to run the service provided they had an internet connec-
tion and internet browser.
The generative process goes beyond adaptations to
hardware and software: it also leads to the emergence
of altogether new actors and processes. The outbreak
of the WannaCry ransomware worm provides a clear ex-
ample of these other forms of generativity. Take a mo-
ment to consider the strange trajectory of events which
led up to theWannaCry ransomware outbreak. First, the
US National Security Agency (NSA) developed a num-
ber of exploit tools to be used for intelligence gathering
and offensive cyber operations (Burgess, 2017). These
vulnerabilities were then leaked by The Shadow Bro-
kers (whose identity and intentions remain unverified)
(Goodin, 2017), before going on to being used as part
of the WannaCry ransomware deployed by North Korea
(Volz, 2017). Here, a number of previously separate pro-
cesses have become embedded: the NSA’s development
of cyber tools for intelligence gathering and offensive cy-
ber operations led to both the development of a group
that leaked these tools before a separate global breakout
of ransomware.
Taking the response to malware for example, hard-
ware and software vendors initially tried to protect their
own products and services. Yet, it did not take long for
an anti-virus industry to form (McAleavey, 2011). The
assemblage of actors and processes involved with mal-
ware has expanded further still, includingwhite-hat hack-
ers, bug bounties and crypto-markets that illegally sell
malware tools. Some of these emerging actors and pro-
cesses will have further knock-on effects: the emergence
of online illegal malware market will create new govern-
ment police and cybercrime units. Cybersecurity is re-
plete with examples of these sort of generative cascades
that creates unstable processes where the implications
of an emerging technology, in terms of its impact on
the development and emergence of both actors and pro-
cesses, is highly uncertain.
This five-shiftmodel of security assemblage has impli-
cations for security provision today. While states were in-
volved since the beginning of cyber security assemblage
processes, they have significantly developed their politi-
cal role and capabilities in the last decade. Throughout
the emergence and development of cyber security as-
semblages, private actors have therefore enjoyed a sig-
nificant degree of agency. The more recent further emer-
gence of government actors therefore explains many of
the tensions observed today. Whether it is encryption
disputes, the increasing regulation of cyber security is-
sues, or the knowledge of vulnerabilities that govern-
ment actors withhold, states increasingly challenge, dis-
rupt and often undermine the norms and practices that
have previously been established amongst private ac-
tors. Government actors often ‘argue through the past’
(Stevens, 2016) evoking, for example, historical analo-
gies regarding their previous ability to access the data of
criminals and terrorist suspects through wiretaps in an
attempt to make normative claims and justify why they
should be able to access encrypted data. Here, states
play on their broadly-perceived legitimacy within other
security issues in the past to justify an expanded role in
the context of cyber security in the future. As private ac-
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tors have developedwith relativelyminimal state involve-
ment since the 1990s, as the state now enters this space
further, their previous lack of involvement makes their
increasingly active role and their legitimacy as a security
actor controversial and increasingly contested.
The diachronic nature of cyber security assemblages
is therefore critical. The above analysis highlights the
dynamic and highly unstable nature of cyber security
assemblages. This constant to-and-froing of cyber secu-
rity providers, as their power, roles and responsibilities
shift, stands as a perennial feature in the development
of cyber security assemblages. It remains unclear what
aspects of cyber security will eventually be ‘public’ or
‘private’. These contestations are therefore largely unre-
solved. Flat analyses of cyber security that neglect these
ongoing processes thereforemiss crucial components re-
garding the nature of contemporary security provision.
4. Conclusion
This article has introduced a framework for how the
assemblage concept can be applied to cyber security.
Yet specific cyber security issues have their own unique
features—the dynamics of a US encryption assemblage
are rather different to an international internet gover-
nance assemblage for example.Moving forward, the con-
cept has greater utilitywhen applied to specific case stud-
ies. Here, it can be used to examine the issues outlined
above, with focus on how security actors interact and
with consideration towards power relations, incentive
structures and the practices that embed actors together.
The cyber security assemblage concept goes beyond
merely recognising the importance of non-state actors or
the interdependence between different actors. Crucially,
the concept unearths and captures processes that are es-
sential to contemporary cyber security challenges—the
current disputes over what should be ‘public’ and ‘pri-
vate’, the presence of contradictory trends as different
security actors cooperate and compete with each other
simultaneously, a consideration of the diachronic nature
of cyber security provision, and the emerging hybridity
of cyber security practices that cannot be neatly accom-
modated within traditional theoretical paradigms.
Thinking with assemblages is useful for understand-
ing the security implications of particular configurations
of actors. Discussions of cyber security have become lop-
sided. Analysis within security studies literature has fo-
cused primarily on issues including attribution, deter-
rence, and offence-defence balance with the dynamics
between security actors often neglected. Yet, when con-
sidering the relationships between actors—the extent to
whichmutual understandings of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are
settled or disputed, or whether there are clashing incen-
tives between actors—these are issues that have funda-
mental implications towards the nature of security.
Whilst the arguments within this article are largely
theoretical, the benefits of an assemblage approach also
lie in its practical application. In a security environment
where issues such as the use of contractors and diverse
supply-chains present security concerns, understanding
the network of security actors and how actors relate
to one another is important. Thinking with assemblages
can be used to understand shifts in actor’s capabilities.
As public and private actors seek to expand their remit,
the assemblage framework provides a lens for captur-
ing processes such as securitisation that present very
real threats to individuals. Viewing the growth of private
sector actors through an assemblage paradigm brings
attention to the nascent challenges they face. As tech-
nology firms expand, their purview has increased expo-
nentially as they are confronted with strategic, ethical
and foreign-policy alignment challenges. Here, an assem-
blage approach brings attention to the profoundly politi-
cal nature of many of these private firms.
Theremay also be useful comparative insights. Cyber
security assemblages, however they are drawn, contrast
starkly within different contexts. This provides insight
into the different strategic challenges each government
faces. Taking the US for example, the incentive structures
of private actors often run contrary to the interests of
the US government in relation to issues including encryp-
tion. A US cyber security assemblage is therefore char-
acterised largely by disputes and friction between pub-
lic and private actors. A Chinese cyber security assem-
blage, by contrast, contains a much greater level of har-
mony between different security actors. Such a compar-
ison, therefore helps policymakers understand the chal-
lenges they face, and crucially the relative characteristics
of the assemblages that they operate in.
Often underestimated, challenges related to security
provision are critical to cyber security. The configuration
of security actors, and how actors relate to one another,
have fundamental implications for the nature of cyber se-
curity. The discipline of IR has much to offer in develop-
ing a fuller understanding of these issues. Thinking with
assemblages provides a promising framework for advanc-
ing such an endeavour.
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